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8	
Introduction	
	
Artificial	Intelligence	(AI),	Robots,	and	anything	in	between	seems	to	be	the	hot	topic	when	
talking	about	the	job	market.	Even	if	you	simply	type	‘Automation'	into	Google,	the	output	will	
be	an	abundance	of	articles	titled	"Robots	Are	Coming	For	Your	Job"	or	something	along	those	
lines.	While	we	have	been	able	to	automate	things	for	a	long	time,	our	progressions	in	the	field	
of	automation	have	been	growing	exponentially	in	recent	years.	Perhaps	this	is	why	there	is	a	
current	wave	of	anxiety	toward	this	subject.	Nonetheless,	relative	to	how	prevalent	it	is	
becoming,	many	people’s	fears	are	quite	irrational,	as	they	don’t	really	understand	what	our	
technological	advancements	are,	and	how	they	are	going	to	affect	them.	
This	essay	serves	to	answer	those	two	important	questions:	what	is	this	technology	and	
who	is	going	to	be	affected	and	how.	We	will	explain	on	a	high	level	(without	diving	into	
complex	computer	science	concepts	and	jargon)	what	automation	and	artificial	intelligence	are	
and	what	happens	when	they	are	combined.	Next,	we	will	make	sense	of	why	society	is	
convinced	that	this	technology	will	eventually	replace	them	in	the	workplace	and	use	a	
neoclassical	framework	to	portray	what	may	actually	happen.	And	finally,	we	will	look	at	the	
overall	economic	implications	of	being	able	to	automate	more	and	more	kinds	of	labor,	and	
provide	policy	recommendations	to	either	stop	or	offset	them.	In	no	way	are	the	concerns	of	
many	that	artificial	intelligence	will	be	capable	of	replicating	what	they	do	for	a	living	and	will	
“take	their	jobs”	totally	farfetched.	However,	it	is	fundamental	to	build	a	framework	for	
understanding	this	prevailing	ideology	in	depth,	so	that	we	can	understand	it	on	a	level	that	we	
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can	actually	do	something	about	it.	But	before	we	jump	to	conclusions,	we	need	to	understand	
what	automation	and	AI	are	in	the	first	place.	
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Chapter	1:	What	is	AI	and	Automation?	
	 	
It	is	evident	that	in	general,	people	are	aware	of	the	fact	that	there	is	some	sort	of	
conflict	between	this	thing	called	automation	and	the	labor	market.	The	trend	of	this	topic’s	
significance	has	gotten	strong	enough	to	the	point	where	it	has	caught	the	attention	of	people	
who	don’t	possess	the	same	technical	knowledge	of	people	in	the	field	of	computer	science.	
Therefore,	if	we	wish	to	explore	this	in	deeper	detail,	it	is	essential	to	first	explain	what	this	
thing	is	that	is	supposedly	going	to	take	our	jobs.	After	we	define	what	automation	and	artificial	
intelligence	are,	it	is	equally	important	to	distinguish	between	the	two	because	most	people	
use	the	terms	automation	and	artificial	intelligence	interchangeably,	when	in	reality,	they	are	
two	totally	different	things.	Although	they	are	independent	concepts,	they	do	come	together	to	
create	‘Cognitive	Automation’,	which	will	also	have	a	role	when	looking	at	the	issue	at	hand	
(IBM).	
	
1.1	Automation,	artificial	intelligence,	and	cognitive	automation	
	 Let	us	begin	by	looking	at	automation.	The	dictionary	defines	automation	as	“the	
technique,	method,	or	system	of	operating	or	controlling	a	process	by	highly	automatic	means,	
as	by	electronic	devices,	reducing	human	intervention	to	a	minimum”	(Dictionary.com).	For	our	
use,	we	will	define	it	as	any	hardware	or	software	that	works	mostly	automatically	with	minimal	
human	intervention.	The	reason	why	it	is	so	important	to	allow	for	some	human	intervention	is	
because,	as	we	will	explore	later	on,	that	automation	doesn’t	have	to	completely	replace	
human	labor	for	it	to	have	an	impact	on	the	job	market.	For	example,	automation	that	can	work	
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with	humans	and	in	turn	make	them	more	efficient,	increase	their	output,	etc.	will	still	have	a	
significant	impact	on	labor	and	specifically,	demand	for	human	labor.	Another	key	component	
of	automation	as	it	stands	on	its	own	is	that	humans	are	necessary	on	the	front-end	for	the	
hardware	or	software	to	perform	the	task	as	it	is	supposed	to.	For	example,	think	of	an	alarm.	If	
one	wants	to	wake	up	at	8:30	am	in	the	morning,	he/she	will	have	to	program	the	clock	to	go	
off	at	that	time.	The	process	of	the	alarm	going	off	at	8:30	am	is	a	form	of	automation.	The	
alarm	itself	is	incapable	of	programming	itself	to	perform	its	task,	however,	with	human	input,	
it	can	automatically.	As	we	will	reveal	later	on,	unlike	artificial	intelligence,	automation	can	and	
does	pose	a	threat	to	certain	types	of	labor	on	its	own	(Ideyatech).	
Next,	let's	talk	about	artificial	intelligence	and	define	what	it	is.	According	to	Springer’s	
Handbook	of	Automation,	artificial	intelligence	is	when	non-living	machines	are	able	to	
replicate	intelligent	behavior;	something	that	once	could	only	be	found	in	humans	and	animals.	
Some	examples	of	the	tasks	that	computers	are	able	to	imitate	are	seeing,	learning,	using	tools,	
understanding	human	speech,	reasoning,	making	good	guesses,	playing	games,	and	formulating	
plans	and	objectives.	As	you	can	see,	these	are	jobs	that	humans	perform	and	earn	a	salary	for	
in	the	labor	market,	and	the	better	machines	get	at	performing	them,	the	more	incentive	
business	owners	may	have	toward	“employing”	computers	instead.	Artificial	intelligence	needs	
a	platform	(hardware	or	software)	for	it	to	express	itself	and	function.	Therefore,	it	does	not	
pose	a	threat	on	its	own	like	automation	does.	However,	when	paired	with	automation,	
artificial	intelligence	can	constitute	a	risk	to	parts	of	the	labor	market	that	we	have	never	seen	
before.	
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The	product	of	automation	and	artificial	intelligence	is	what	most	people	fear	when	they	
think	of	robots	taking	their	jobs:	Cognitive	Intelligence	(Deloitte).	There	are	two	reasons	why	
people	are	recently	fearing	our	development	in	his	space:	1)	our	capabilities	within	it	have	
grown	exponentially	in	recent	years	and	2)	this	means	that	we	can	replicate	human	behavior	
and	tasks	that	were	always	deemed	“untouchable”	by	technology.	If	we	go	back	to	the	example	
of	the	alarm,	an	example	of	Cognitive	Automation	would	be	if	the	alarm	was	able	to	learn	from	
one’s	sleeping	patterns	and	program	itself	to	go	off	at	the	correct	time	and	perhaps	even	at	the	
optimal	time	once	the	user	has	had	the	optimal	amount	of	sleep	for	the	night.	We	can	go	even	
further	and	say	that	cognitive	automation	could	allow	the	watch	to	communicate	with	other	
devices	such	as	a	smartphone,	to	extract	data	on	the	user’s	schedule,	the	weather,	etc.	to	make	
decisions	on	when	to	permit	the	alarm	to	go	off	and	provide	recommendations	to	the	user	
based	on	these	things	(how	to	dress,	how	much	time	is	left	before	he/she	must	leave	for	work,	
options	on	how	to	spend	that	time,	etc.)	This	is	a	basic	example	of	how	automation	(the	watch)	
and	artificial	intelligence	(the	ability	for	the	watch	to	act	intelligently	and	make	intelligent	
decisions)	can	come	together	to	create	cognitive	automation.	This	example	by	no	means	would	
replace	anyone	job;	in	fact,	the	development	of	this	concept	would	even	create	some.	
However,	the	notion	of	cognitive	intelligence	can	be	applied	to	many	scenarios	that	do	directly	
impact	the	labor	market,	and	we	will	explore	these	later	on	in	this	thesis.	
	
1.2	How	do	these	concepts	relate	to	economics?		
So,	why	should	we	care	and	why	is	it	important	to	apply	these	technological	
advancements	to	the	workplace?	Other	than	the	aforementioned	trend	that	robots	are	
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supposedly	going	to	take	all	of	our	jobs,	there	are	several	real	implications	of	our	technological	
advancements	in	the	economy.	First,	while	it	is	probably	impossible	for	automation	and	AI	to	
take	all	of	our	jobs,	there	will	certainly	be	(and	we	have	already	started	to	see	it	happen)	be	
certain	types	of	labor	that	can	be	replicated	by	technology,	and	therefore	cause	new	waves	of	
"technological	unemployment".	Obviously,	not	all	labor	is	the	same,	so	we	will	section	the	labor	
market	into	various	segments	so	we	can	obtain	real	forecasts	on	how	new	technology	will	
affect	employment	within	them.	Specifically,	the	type	of	work	in	the	economy	will	be	
segmented	into	3	categories:	low,	medium,	and	high-skilled	labor,	and	we	will	analyze	how	
automation	and	AI	have	impacted	the	employment	within	each	and	attempt	to	forecast	how	it	
will	be	affected	as	we	advance.	Although	we	will	use	these	three	types	of	labor	for	traceability,	
it	is	important	to	note	that	there	are	more	nuances	in	the	types	of	labor	that	exist	in	the	
economy.	
Another	severe	economic	issue	that	can	ascend	from	our	technological	progression	is	
the	large,	and	growing	level	of	income	inequality	in	the	United	States.	The	connection	between	
technological	unemployment	and	income	distribution	derives	from	my	initial	hypothesis	that	in	
our	current	state	and	in	the	short-run	we	are	and	will	be	able	to	automate	almost	all	jobs	
considered	low-skilled.	The	following	graphic	by	McKinsey	&	Company	can	be	used	to	confirm	
this	hypothesis:	
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The	above	graph,	which	uses	data	from	the	US	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	accurately	confirms	
our	ability	to	automate	low-skilled	jobs,	like	predictable	physical	labor,	across	a	variety	of	
industries.	The	more	leftward	on	the	graph	the	activity	type,	the	more	skill	is	required	to	
complete	it.	Our	ability	to	automate	more	leftward	activities	on	the	graph	has	been	growing	at	
a	rapid	pace	and	will	continue	to	do	so	in	the	long-run.	But	our	ability	to	automate	low-skilled	
activities	on	the	right	is	alarming,	as	in	most	industries	we	are	currently	able	to	automate	more	
than	half	of	jobs.	The	following	graph	can	be	used	to	confirm	that	our	ability	to	automate	low-
skilled	work	is	indeed	an	income	inequality	issue.	The	bottom	end	of	the	income	distribution,	
Figure	1-1	
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the	end	that	we	are	trying	to	protect	and	make	better	off	in	order	to	reduce	income	inequality	
in	the	US,	is	mostly	populated	by	low-skilled	workers:		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
As	you	can	see,	a	huge	majority	(70+%)	of	low-skilled	workers	earned	less	than	$35,000	in	2015	
(Freddie	Mac).	Income	inequality	is	an	enormous	problem	in	the	United	States,	and	if	capitalists	
are	able	to	replace	all	low-skilled	work	with	a	cheaper,	more	efficient	option,	namely	
automation,	and	AI,	that	would	only	make	this	matter	dangerously	worse.	
	 While	robots	will	not	take	all	of	our	jobs,	there	are	real	economic	concerns	that	we	need	
to	be	made	aware	of.	This	thesis	aims	to	build	a	framework	to	explain	the	effects	of	one	of	the	
main	issues,	technological	employment,	in	the	three	types	of	labor,	and	reveal	how	much	of	the	
labor	market	is	vulnerable	to	these	technological	changes.	If	the	low-skilled	workforce	will	
Figure	1-2	
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suffer	the	bulk	of	the	consequences,	this	will	have	a	detrimental	outcome	on	income	inequality	
and	the	US	economy	as	a	whole.	We	will	now	begin	to	attempt	to	answer	these	questions.	
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Chapter	2:	Building	a	Framework	for	Applying	AI	and	Artificial	Intelligence	to	the	Labor	
Market	
	
2.1	Labor	Demand	
	 At	the	end	of	the	day,	the	impact	of	automation	and	artificial	intelligence	on	
employment	will	come	down	to	its	effect	on	labor	demand.	Labor	demand	is	the	amount	of	
labor	a	firm	is	willing	or	seeking	to	hire	to	achieve	a	certain	level	of	output.	This	is	the	best	
approach	at	understanding	how	our	technological	advancements	will	affect	the	labor	market	
because	if	we	can	observe	that	this	technology	will	drive	labor	demand	down,	we	can	conclude	
that	it	will,	in	fact,	cause	technological	unemployment.	Otherwise,	if	the	labor	demand	within	a	
segment	of	the	labor	market	is	unharmed	by	our	technological	development,	we	can	
hypothesize	that	we	are/will	be	unable	to	replicate	such	labor,	and	as	such	we	will	need	to	
employ	the	same	amount	of	humans	to	perform	it.		
Before	we	begin	to	build	a	model	with	complex	functions	and	graphs,	it	is	important	to	
lay	out	the	foundations	of	a	neoclassical	labor	model,	so	that	we	can	not	only	have	a	starting	
point	to	build	from	but	understand	the	assumptions	and	boundaries	that	we	can	work	within.	
First,	firms	simply	hire	(whether	it	be	humans	or	capital)	as	"middle	men".	In	other	words,	firms	
do	not	blindly	hire	units	of	input	for	the	sake	of	filling	a	spot.	Rather,	they	hire	in	order	to	fulfill	
the	existing	demand	of	consumers.	Therefore,	firms	will	hire	up	until	the	point	that	they	can	
produce	the	amount	of	goods/services	that	there	is	a	demand	for	because	they	are	profit-
maximizing;	any	additional	units	of	input	from	this	point	on	will	by	nature	sway	the	firm	away	
from	the	profit-maximizing	point.	We	will	get	more	in	depth	on	this	later.	
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2.2	The	production	function	
Evidently,	since	production	is	the	fundamental	driver	for	firms	to	employ,	the	next	most	
important	notion	to	look	at	will	be	a	firm’s	production	function.	The	firm’s	production	function	
is	a	measure	of	a	firms	output	(q)	as	a	function	of	a	combination	of	two	inputs:	1)	Labor	(E)	and	
2)	Capital	(K),	written	as:	
	 [1]	q=f(E,K)	
It	is	easy	to	get	the	sense	that	this	is	an	optimal	measure	of	output	given	the	question	we	are	
trying	to	answer.	For	example,	if	firms	can	produce	the	equivalent	output	level	q	at	a	lower	
cost,	with	a	new	combination	of	E	and	K	that	replaces	human	workers	with	more	capital,	the	
effects	of	automation	on	employment	will,	in	fact,	be	a	negative	one.	Again,	once	we	are	done	
laying	out	the	framework,	we	will	dive	deeper	into	this	issue.		
	 The	most	important	concept	in	regards	to	the	production	function	is	the	concept	of	
marginal	product.	Marginal	product	measures	the	change	in	production	that	results	in	an	
increase	of	a	single	unit	of	input.	For	example,	the	marginal	product	of	labor	is	the	additional	
output	gained	from	hiring	one	more	worker	and	can	be	labeled	as	(MPe).	Therefore,	the	
marginal	product	of	capital	(MPk)	is	the	additional	output	gained	from	purchasing	an	additional	
unit	of	capital.	Marginal	product	abides	by	the	law	of	diminishing	returns,	which	means	that	the	
marginal	unit	of	either	labor	or	capital	will	increase	output	but	at	a	decreasing	rate.	Hence,	an	
additional	unit	will	increase	Q,	but	less	so	than	the	previous	unit.	Calculating	and	analyzing	
these	measurements	is	imperative	to	answer	our	question	because	it	is	what	firms	use	to	gauge	
their	hiring	decisions.		
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	 Before	we	explore	how	firms	use	marginal	product	to	make	decisions,	we	first	need	to	
lay	out	a	few	assumptions	about	how	firms	operate	and	the	environment	that	they	operate	in.	
First	off,	in	this	framework,	we	will	assume	that	prices	are	fixed	because	firms	compete	in	a	
perfectly	competitive	environment	and	are	profit	maximizing.	This	means	that	firms	are	guided	
only	by	profits	when	making	decisions.	Profits	are	equal	to	total	revenue	minus	total	costs.	
Therefore,	in	our	framework,	we	can	equate	profits	as:	
	 [2]	Profits	=	pq-wE-rK	
Where	(pq)	is	price	times	quantity	(or	revenue),	(w)	is	the	wage	rate,	and	(r)	is	the	price	of	
capital.	
	
2.3	The	short-run	hiring	decision	
Now	we	can	begin	to	explore	how	firms	use	marginal	product	to	make	decisions	in	the	
short	run.	In	the	short-run,	we	assume	that	firms	cannot	change	their	level	of	capital	and	it	is	
fixed.	This	is	because	increasing	or	adding	more	capital	takes	time	and	is	expensive.	Since	this	
notion	is	extremely	confining,	especially	for	this	thesis,	which	seeks	to	explore	the	potential	
substitution	of	employment	for	new	capital,	the	bulk	of	our	analysis	will	be	done	in	the	long-
run.	Nonetheless,	it	is	important	to	briefly	derive	how	firms	operate	in	the	short-run,	so	we	can	
better	understand	our	current	situation	in	terms	of	the	labor-capital	substitution	decision	and	
can	obtain	a	better	starting	point	to	compare	with	our	forecasts	for	the	long-run	or	the	“future	
state”	as	we	will	call	it.		
		 Since	firms	can	only	change	output	by	increasing	or	decreasing	the	amount	of	workers	
they	have	in	the	short-run,	profit-maximizing	firms	will	fire	up	until	the	wage	rate	(w)	equals	
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the	value	of	marginal	product	of	labor	(VMPe).	VMPe	calculated	by	taking	the	marginal	product	
of	labor	and	multiplying	it	by	price.	This	gives	us	the	value	in	dollar	terms	that	an	additional	unit	
of	labor	will	provide	the	firm,	which	makes	it	ideal	to	compare	to	the	wage	rate.	Graphically	the	
short-run	hiring	decision	can	be	visualized	as	such:		
Since	worker	number	8	provides	$22	worth	of	value	to	the	firm	but	also	cost	the	firm	an	
additional	$22,	this	is	the	profit	maximizing	point.	This	makes	sense	because	of	the	law	of	
diminishing	returns,	which	tells	us	that	the	next	worker	will	provide	the	firm	with	less	than	$22	
worth	of	value,	but	will	be	paid	the	same,	resulting	in	negative	profit	for	the	firm.	
	
2.4	The	long-run	hiring	decision	 	
Figure	2-1	
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	 Now	that	we	have	established	how	firms	make	hiring	decisions	in	the	current	state	of	
capital,	let	us	now	explore	how	they	make	decisions	when	the	assumption	of	fixed	capital	is	
removed	in	the	long-run.	Therefore,	the	firm	must	now	choose	not	only	the	ideal	amount	of	
workers	to	maximize	profit,	but	now	the	profit-maximizing	point	consists	of	an	ideal	
combination	of	both	labor	and	capital	to	achieve	that	level	of	output.	To	answer	our	question,	
we	will	mostly	perform	analysis	in	the	long-run	as	it	allows	us	to	show	how	much	companies	are	
willing	to	substitute	capital	for	labor	over	time	as	we	advance	technologically.	For	example,	an	
early	hypothesis	is	that	as	automation	and	artificial	intelligence	becomes	better	and	more	
efficient	at	replicating	human	work,	firms	will	opt	to	expand	our	equipment	by	hiring	more	
capital	instead	of	labor.	
	
2.5	Isoquant	curves	
	 Since	labor	and	capital	are	both	variable	in	the	long	run,	there	are	several	combinations	
of	E	and	K	that	produce	the	same	level	of	output.	Graphically,	a	set	of	combinations	that	render	
the	same	output	takes	the	form	of	an	Isoquant	curve	and	have	the	following	properties:	they	
are	downward	sloping,	convex	to	the	origin,	higher	isoquants	(that	are	further	away	from	the	
origin)	are	associated	with	a	higher	levels	of	output	(and	in	turn	higher	costs),	and	two	different	
isoquant	curves	can	never	intersect.	Isoquant	curves	can	be	visualized	as	such:	
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As	previously	mentioned,	each	point	on	the	isoquant	curve	“q0”	results	in	the	same	level	of	
output.	In	this	case,	combinations	X	and	point	Y	lie	on	the	same	curve	and	thus	result	in	the	
same	output.	However,	at	point	X,	the	firm	hires	more	capital	to	achieve	this	level	of	
production,	and	consequently,	at	point	Y,	the	firm	does	so	by	hiring	more	labor.	The	further	
away	from	the	origin	an	isoquant	curve	is,	the	costlier	it	is	to	produce	at	that	level.	Therefore,	it	
is	evident	that	the	combinations	that	lay	on	isoquant	curve	“q1”	are	more	expensive	than	those	
on	q0.	The	slope	of	the	isoquant	curve	is	given	by	the	negative	value	of	the	ratio	of	marginal	
products:		 Δ𝐾Δ𝐸 = −	𝑀𝑃𝑒𝑀𝑃𝑘	
	
Figure	2-2	
[3]	
		
23	
The	absolute	value	of	the	slope	is	called	the	marginal	rate	of	technological	substitution,	which	
tells	us	the	rate	at	which	we	substitute	technology	for	labor;	a	measure	very	important	to	this	
thesis.		The	slope	of	an	isoquant	curve	can	also	be	measured	by	the	negative	value	of	the	ratio	
of	input	costs	(-w/r).	This	means	that	next	dollar	spent	on	a	unit	of	either	labor	or	capital	
produces	the	same	output	as	if	it	were	spent	on	the	other.	If	this	is	true,	money	cannot	be	
reallocated	better	and	we	are	therefore	in	equilibrium.	
	
2.6	Isocost	curves	
	 Until	this	point,	we	have	been	working	under	the	assumption	that	firms	always	make	
decisions	that	maximize	their	profit.	While	this	will	always	remain	true,	we	will	now	add	
another	key	assumption:	firms	are	also	cost-minimizing.	While	these	two	assumptions	are	in	
some	ways	synonymous,	including	both	has	significant	implications	on	the	model.	Since	labor	
and	capital	are	now	both	variable	in	the	long-run	and	there	are	several	combinations	to	achieve	
a	profit-maximizing	output,	we	now	need	to	analyze	which	combination	is	optimal.	The	optimal	
combination	is	the	mix	of	E	and	K	that	yields	maximum	output	at	minimum	cost.	In	order	to	
incorporate	this	into	our	framework,	we	will	introduce	the	concept	of	an	isocost	curve.	The	cost	
of	a	given	firm	is	represented	by:	
[4]	C=w(E)+r(K)	
An	isocost	line	represents	all	combinations	of	E	and	K	that	are	equally	costly.	Since	this	function	
is	linear,	the	best	way	to	plot	it	is	to	plot	two	extreme	cases	and	connect	to	two	points.	The	two	
extreme	cases	a	firm	planning	on	spending	a	certain	amount	of	dollars	can	choose	from	is	
either	to	spend	it	all	on	capital	and	hire	no	workers,	or	hire	only	labor	and	purchase	no	capital.	
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In	the	first	case,	whose	isocost	line	we	will	call	“C0”,	the	firm	will	hire	
+,- 	units	of	capital	(which	is	
derived	by	solving	for	K	in	the	above	equation)	and	obviously	no	workers.	This	will	give	us	a	
point	laying	on	the	Y-axis.	In	the	second	extreme	case	on	the	same	isocost	line,	the	firm	will	hire	
+,. 	workers,	and	no	capital,	which	will	give	us	a	point	on	the	X-axis.	If	we	connect	these	two	
points,	we	can	visualize	isocost	line	C0,	where	all	points	(combinations	of	E	and	K)	on	the	line	
are	equally	as	costly:	
	 	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
As	an	isocost	line	moves	further	away	from	the	origin,	the	costlier	the	combinations	are	that	fall	
on	that	line.	In	the	example	above,	isocost	line	labeled	“C1”	is	therefore	costlier	than	isocost	
curve	C1.	Understanding	how	to	calculate	the	slope	of	isocost	lines	will	play	an	important	role	in	
Figure	2-3	
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the	development	of	this	thesis	moving	forward.	It	helps	to	rearrange	the	original	cost	equation	
C	as	follows:	
[5]	K=	+--	.-E	
This	equation	now	takes	a	standard	linear	form	of	“y=mx+b”	with	y-intercept	+-	and	slope	−.- 	.	
The	steeper	the	isocost	curve,	the	cheaper	capital	is	compared	to	labor	and	vice	versa	when	it	is	
flatter.	
	
2.7	The	long-run	hiring	equilibrium	point	
	 Now	that	we	have	a	good	understanding	of	isoquant	and	isocost	lines,	and	that	firms	
are	motivation	by	both	profit-maximization	and	cost-minimization,	we	can	now	calculate	for	
the	optimal	combination	of	E	and	K	that	satisfies	these	motives.	This	equilibrium	point	is	very	
important	because	the	bulk	of	our	analysis	will	examine	how	this	point	(the	combination	of	
capital	and	labor	that	a	firm	actually	decides	to	employ)	changes	based	on	technological	
employment.		
	 In	short,	the	profit-maximizing,	cost-minimizing,	and	therefore	optimal	combination	is	
the	point	where	the	isocost	curve	is	tangent	to	the	isoquant	line.	When	a	line	is	tangent	to	a	
curve,	it	means	that	the	line	intersects	it	at	one	single	point	and	not	two.	There	is	only	one	
point	in	which	a	line	intersects	an	isoquant	curve.	This	point	is	the	very	bottom	of	the	curve,	
which	is	why	this	point	implies	cost-minimization.	This	concept	can	be	more	easily	understood	
visually	by	analyzing	the	following	graph:	
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On	the	above	graph,	point	P	is	therefore	the	ideal	point	for	this	firm	to	produce	at.	At	this	point,	
the	firm	produces	q0	units	of	output	at	the	lowest	possible	cost	which	in	this	case	is	175	units	of	
capital	and	100	workers.	Points	A	and	B	also	result	in	the	same	level	of	output	q0	but	fall	on	the	
isocost	line	q1,	which	makes	them	costlier	than	P	and	not	the	levels	of	E	and	K	that	the	firm	will	
hire	at.		
	 To	calculate	for	this	tangent	point	P,	we	set	the	slopes	of	the	isoquant	and	the	isocost	
equal	to	one	another:		
/01/02	=	.- 	
	
Figure	2-4	
[6]	
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Therefore,	profit-maximization	and	cost-minimization	require	the	marginal	rate	of	substitution	
to	equal	the	ratio	of	input	prices.	The	intuition	behind	this	can	be	better	understood	if	we	
rearrange	the	equation	as	such:	
/01. 	=	/02- 	
What	this	tells	us	is,	that	the	last	unit	of	both	capital	and	labor,	produce	at	the	cost	of	
employing	it.	If	we	recall	from	the	short-run,	where	the	firms	hiring	decision	is	confined	to	how	
many	employees	they	want	to	hire	as	capital	is	fixed,	we	equated	the	wage	rate	to	not	just	the	
marginal	product	of	the	last	employee.	But	rather	the	value	of	MPe	in	dollar	terms.	In	the	long-
run,	now	that	we	also	consider	how	much	capital	to	purchase,	we	will	also	equate	the	price	of	
capital	to	the	value	of	the	marginal	product	of	capital.	Therefore,	long-run	profit-maximizing	
also	requires	labor	and	capital	to	be	hired	up	until	this	point	(up	until	marginal	cost	equals	
marginal	benefit):	
[8]	w=p*(MPe)	and	r=p*(MPk)	
Only	after	including	these	profit-maximizing	conditions,	which	also	imply	cost-minimization,	do	
we	have	both	objectives	in	place.	
	
2.8	The	elasticity	of	substitution	
	 An	essential	indicator	that	can	help	us	determine	whether	or	not	automation	and	
artificial	intelligence	will	be	able	to	technologically	displace	workers,	is	the	elasticity	of	
substitution.	A	firm’s	elasticity	of	substitution	measures	a	firm’s	ability	to	replace	production	
from	a	worker	with	capital	and	vice	versa.	For	example,	if	technology	can	in	fact	replace	and	
“unemploy”	workers,	then	it	must	be	true	that	a	firm	can	replace	labor	with	the	same	or	less	
[7]	
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capital	(in	terms	of	cost).	Profit-maximizing	and	cost-minimizing	firms	will	not	purchase	capital	
in	place	of	workers	if	the	technology	is	not	as	efficient	as	humans.	Again,	a	better	
comprehension	of	this	notion	can	be	acquired	by	looking	at	the	two	extreme	cases:		
	
	
	
	
In	the	first	case,	where	isoquant	curve	q0	is	linear,	workers	and	capital	are	perfect	substitutes	
for	one	another.	This	means	that	there	is	a	constant	tradeoff	between	the	two	inputs.	In	the	
above	example,	for	any	combination	of	E	and	K,	the	work	of	one	unit	of	capital	can	be	replaced	
by	two	workers,	and	vice	versa.	The	optimal	solution	in	this	case	is	to	hire	only	capital	or	labor;	
whichever	is	cheaper.	In	case	(b),	where	the	isoquant	curve	q0	represents	a	right	angle,	the	two	
inputs	are	perfect	compliments,	which	means	that	there	is	only	one	recipe	to	produce	this	level	
of	output.	In	this	case,	the	recipe	is	five	units	of	capital	and	20	workers	and	increasing	one	input	
or	the	other	does	not	result	in	any	increased	outputs.	In	between	these	two	extremes	are	a	
Figure	2-5	
b) Perfect	Substitutes	 a) Perfect	Compliments	
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number	of	substitution	possibilities	that	take	the	form	of	a	regularly	curved	isoquant	that	we	
will	work	with.	The	flatter	an	isoquant	is,	the	more	it	resembles	the	linear	example	and	
therefore	has	a	higher	substitution	effect.	The	more	curved	a	curve	is,	the	more	similar	it	is	to	a	
right	angle	and	has	a	lower	substitution	effect.	To	measure	curvature/substitution	we	use	the	
following	equation:	
[9]	Elasticity	of	Substitution=
%∆ 56%∆ 78 	
If	the	isoquant	is	linear,	line	in	example	(a),	this	equation	will	equal	∞	and	if	the	curve	is	right-
angled,	it	will	equal	0.	Therefore,	the	higher	the	Elasticity	of	Substitution,	the	less	curved	the	
isoquant	curve	is,	and	vice	versa.	We	will	use	this	equation	to	show	the	effect	technological	
advancements	have	on	the	substitution	between	the	two	inputs,	and	specifically,	if	it	will	
change	isoquants	and	their	curvature,	resulting	in	unemployment	(Borjas).		
	 	
2.9	Shifts	in	labor	demand	due	to	changes	of	elasticity	of	substitution	
	 The	relationship	between	the	elasticity	of	substitution	and	labor	demand	is	what	is	going	to	
drive	the	analysis	we	will	perform	to	answer	our	question.	Our	next	goal	will	be	to	show	how	
our	improvements	in	the	field	of	automation	and	AI	will	cause	capital	and	employment	to	
become	more	substitutes	of	one	another,	how	it	changes	the	elasticity	of	substitution,	and	
ultimately	labor	demand/the	hiring	decision.	The	following	graphic	shows	what	happens	when	
we	improve	at	automating	human	behavior	or	are	able	to	do	it	at	a	lower	cost	relative	to	
wages,	which	would	in	turn	shift	the	isoquant	curve	to	reflect	firms'	preference	to	purchase	
capital:	 	
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Current	Tech	
	
	
Figure	2-6	represent	the	outcome	of	increased	cost-efficiency	of	technology	relative	to	wages.	
As	we	will	outline	later,	if	this	technology	does	in	fact	become	most	cost-efficient	than	labor,	
the	isocost	curve	will	be	steep.	We	will	hypothesize	in	the	next	chapter	that	there	is	a	strong	
possibility	that	this	is	true	and	we	will	use	a	steep	isocost	curve	from	here	on	out.	Therefore,	
the	new	isoquant	curve	(q1)	is	flattened,	and	due	to	the	steep	slope	of	the	isocost	curve	(C0’/r)	
our	new	equilibrium	combination	is	P’.	In	this	new	state,	the	firm	will	hire	200	units	of	capital,	
and	only	50	units	of	labor,	to	produce	the	same	output	as	before.	As	a	result,	50	workers	have	
theoretically	lost	their	jobs	and	have	been	replaced	by	an	additional	25	units	of	new	
technology.	To	recall,	this	occurs	because	we	now	have	access	to	new	technology	that	can	
Figure	2-6	
New	Tech	
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better	replicate	(and	ultimately	be	substituted	for)	human	labor.	And	we	will	hypothesize	that	
our	isocost	curve	is	steep	due	to	the	relative	costs	of	both	capital	and	labor,	we	arrive	at	our	
new	levels	of	employment	and	capital.	
	 We	have	now	successfully	built	a	theoretical	framework	and	sufficiently	outlined	and	
explained	the	tools	we	will	need	to	analyze	the	effects	of	our	development	in	automation	and	
artificial	intelligence	on	the	job	market.	Chapter	3	will	take	the	theory	we	just	laid	out	and	apply	
it	to	the	three	specific	labor	segments:	high,	medium	and	low-skilled	work.	We	will	see	that	
both	the	starting	points	and	outcomes	are	very	different	for	all	three.	Chapter	4	will	examine	
more	closely	the	low-skilled	work	cohort,	as	unique	outcomes	come	from	this	group	with	
severe	implications	on	income	inequality.	In	Chapter	5	we	will	introduce	another	approach,	
which	will	hopefully	confirm	and	therefore	strengthen	our	hypothesis.	And	finally,	in	chapter	6	I	
will	be	outlining	who	the	stakeholders	are	that	have	the	power	to	prevent	this	negative	effect	
on	the	economy	and	provide	recommendations	to	them.	
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Chapter	3:	Analyzing	the	effects	of	Automation	on	Elasticity	of	Substitution		
	
The	theoretical	portion	of	this	thesis	has	now	concluded.	It	is	time	to	take	the	theory	we	
derived	and	apply	it	to	the	issue	at	hand	and	begin	to	answer	some	questions.	In	the	previous	
chapter,	we	concluded	that	the	best	way	to	determine	if	automation	can	actually	cause	
technological	unemployment	is	to	show	its	effect	on	the	elasticity	of	substitution	between	
employment	and	capital.	If	we	recall,	the	flatter	or	less	curved	the	isoquant	is,	the	higher	
degree	of	substitution	is	present.	Therefore,	if	technological	unemployment	is	in	fact	possible,	
then	we	will	see	that	the	isoquant	curve	will	flatten,	which	means	that	workers	and	capital	are	
becoming	more	substitutable	to	one	another	than	before	the	technology	was	introduced.	
Evidently,	the	substitutability	of	technology	for	employees	will	vary	heavily	for	different	kinds	
of	jobs,	which	is	why	we	will	segment	employees	into	three	categories	(low,	medium,	and	high	
skilled)	in	order	to	show	the	different	outcomes	in	each	one.	Each	cohort	will	have	its	own	set	
of	assumptions	necessary	to	perform	proper	analysis,	but	there	are	two	assumptions	applicable	
to	all	three	that	are	very	important	to	remember.	The	first	is	that	firms	in	this	model	act	under	
profit-maximization,	meaning	that	regardless	of	whether	or	not	we	are	able	to	automate	their	
jobs,	it	also	has	to	be	more	cost	efficient	to	do	so.	And	second,	as	we	get	better	and	more	
efficient	in	the	fields	of	automation	and	artificial	intelligence	with	time,	the	costs	of	purchasing	
the	technology	within	these	fields	fall.			
	
3.1	Low-skilled	workers		
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We	will	begin	each	segment	by	outlining	the	current	state	of	substitution	between	man	
and	machine	within	it.	As	it	stands,	low-skilled	work	is	the	easiest	to	automate	and	the	numbers	
reflect	it.	The	heat	map	in	Chapter	1	(figure	1-1)	shows	what	kinds	of	jobs	have	the	potential	to	
be	automated,	but	if	we	look	at	concrete	numbers,	we	can	confirm	that	we	are	able	to,	and	are	
replacing	low-skilled	jobs	with	technology.	To	find	an	example	of	this,	we	will	look	no	further	
than	the	manufacturing	industry;	an	industry	once	heavily	populated	with	low-skilled	workers,	
not	dominated	by	automation.	This	industry	provides	a	sound	example	of	the	current	state	of	
technological	unemployment	of	low-skilled	labor	in	all	industries.	Therefore,	from	our	analysis	
of	the	manufacturing	industry,	we	will	be	able	to	derive	the	isoquant	curve	for	demand	for	low-
skilled	workers	in	the	current	state,	and	use	it	as	a	starting	point	to	show	the	effects	our	short-
run	advancements	in	automation	will	have	on	it.	
	 In	order	to	paint	the	most	accurate	picture	possible	of	the	current	state,	and	therefore	
arrive	at	the	most	accurate	future	state,	we	will	have	to	acquire	facts	and	statistics	from	
multiple	sources.	To	begin,	it	is	no	secret	that	from	2000	to	2010,	the	U.S.	has	lost	5.6	million	
manufacturing	jobs;	an	alarming	amount	(Chui).	But	is	this	entirely	due	to	automation?	Or	are	
there	other	factors	driving	this	job	reduction	in	the	U.S.	like	trade?	Ball	State	University,	in	their	
2017	study	titled	The	Myth	and	the	Reality	of	Manufacturing	in	America	concludes	that	the	
former	is	true:	most	of	(almost	90%)	of	the	modern	job	losses	in	the	manufacturing	industry	are	
due	to	increased	productivity	per	worker	–	due	to	automation	(Hicks).	The	effect	of	our	
advancements	can	be	portrayed	in	the	following	figure	by	the	Financial	Times:	
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As	you	can	see,	Figure	3-1	shows	that	we	are	producing	exponentially	more,	with	a	fraction	of	
the	employees.	Since	these	numbers	include	every	job	and	not	just	low-skilled	jobs,	we	will	
have	to	make	fact-based	assumptions	to	weed	out	the	current	state	of	low-skilled	labor	only.	
Based	on	Figure	1-1,	we	know	that	almost	all	of	the	automation	potential	in	the	manufacturing	
industry	comes	from	low-skilled	jobs.	Therefore,	we	can	make	a	logical	conclusion	that	the	
reduction	in	jobs	due	to	automation	in	the	industry	are	the	low-skilled	jobs	in	relation	to	
production	in	the	factory.	We	now	know	that	currently,	automation	has	displaced	most,	but	not	
all	low-skilled	workers.	The	isoquant	curve	that	exhibits	this	current	state	is	as	follows:	
	
Figure	3-1	
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Given	what	we	know	about	the	relationship	between	low-skilled	work	and	automation	to	this	
point,	the	current	state	of	technological	unemployment	of	low-skilled	employees	is	represented	
by	a	very	flat,	but	not	quite	linear,	isoquant	curve.	As	well,	the	isocost	curve	is	very	steep	due	to	
the	location	of	the	tangent	point,	which	is	determined	by	increasing	wages	and	potentially	
decreasing	prices	of	automation;	but	we	will	emphasize	this	more	in	a	moment.	This	graph	
confirms	that	we	are	currently	experiencing	a	large	amount	of	technological	unemployment	in	
this	segment,	but	there	are	some	low-skilled	jobs	that	aren’t	currently	being	automated	
because	it	is	currently	profit-maximizing	to	hire	a	mix.	Why	is	this	happening	if	we	know	that	all	
low-skilled	work	could	theoretically	be	automated?	Since	firms	chose	in	a	profit-maximizing	and	
cost-minimizing	way,	we	can	conclude	that	the	firms	who	still	opt	to	hire	human	capital,	do	so	
because	within	this	framework	it	is	less	costly	for	them	than	to	buy	and	install	new	technology.	
Figure	3-2	
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Now	that	we	know	what	the	current	state	is,	and	how	we	got	there,	it	is	time	to	talk	
about	the	future	state.	As	mentioned,	since	cost	is	the	most	important	factor	holding	firms	back	
from	replacing	low-skilled	labor,	it	is	obvious	than	that	for	us	to	get	to	our	future	state	(as	seen	
in	figure	3-2),	the	variable	that	changed	the	most	is	in	fact	the	price	of	the	technology.	Before	
we	get	into	the	how,	let	us	explain	what	our	future	state	graph	tells	us.	In	the	future,	
automation	and	human	labor	will	move	closer	toward	being	perfect	substitutes	for	one	
another,	which	means	that	any	firm	can	employ	entirely	humans	or	entirely	automaton	to	
achieve	their	desired	output.	If	the	technology	is	cheaper,	they	will	fully	automate	their	low-
skilled	jobs	and	vice	versa	for	if	labor	is	less	expensive.	So,	which	will	they	choose:	all	humans	or	
all	machines?	The	answer	is	simple:	firms	will	choose	the	cheaper	option	and	that	option,	is	
machines.	Here’s	why:	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3-3	
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Figure	3-3	shows	real	hourly	wages	for	low-skilled	production	workers	in	the	united	states	from	
1932-2017.	As	you	can	see,	their	wages	are	rising,	and	hence	are	becoming	more	expensive.	
One	may	argue	that	this	is	because	workers	are	getting	more	productive	and	therefore	are	
being	paid	accordingly.	While	this	may	be	true,	it	does	not	negate	our	argument	as	marginal	
productivity	has	increased	in	manufacturing	due	to	the	improvement	and	increase	in	capital	
available	to	workers.	This	means	that	while	workers	are	getting	paid	according	to	their	
production	and	fewer	workers	are	needed;	workers	are	still	being	substituted	for	capital	in	this	
case.	
Nonetheless,	it	is	probable	that	this	trend	of	increasing	real	wages,	that	has	existed	for	
nearly	100	years	will	continue	into	the	future.	So,	human	labor	will	become	more	expensive,	
but	is	that	enough	to	conclude	that	technology	will	be	more	cost	efficient	for	every	firm	that	
labor?	Potentially,	but	in	order	to	solidify	our	hypothesis,	we	will	also	prove	that	the	costs	of	
installing	this	technology	will	also	go	down.	This	outcome	can	be	supported	based	on	the	
theory	of	Economies	of	Scale.	When	a	company	experiences	economies	of	scale,	as	production	
increases	in	the	long-run,	average	total	cost	decreases.	If	firms	who	produce	automation	were	
to	experience	economies	of	scale,	then	they	would	be	able	to	produce	the	technology	
necessary	to	replace	low-skilled	workers	at	a	more	affordable	rate,	which	will	impact	the	
decision	to	hire	humans	or	technology.	We	can	suspect	that	much	like	many	other	industries,	
firms	who	produce	automation	will	reach	this	level	of	production	as	well	(Colander).	An	
important	thing	to	note	moving	forward	is	that	for	all	types	of	skill,	we	will	be	guided	by	the	
suggestion	that	since	wages	are	rising	and	the	price	of	new	technology	may	be	falling,	the	cost	
of	automation	will	be	less	than	employees	in	the	long-run,	which	in	essence	is	essential	to	this	
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approach	to	the	topic	at	hand.	Graphically,	this	information	can	support	our	hypothesis	that	the	
isocost	curve	will	be	steeper,	meaning	that	capital	is	more	cost-efficient	than	labor.	Therefore,	
if	firms	put	all	of	their	money	into	automation,	they	will	get	more	units	of	capital	than	they	
would	have	labor	if	they	put	all	of	their	money	into	hiring	employees.	As	we	will	see,	this	will	
drive	our	analysis	and	reveal	some	potential	negative	economic	outcomes	deriving	from	our	
technological	advancement.	
	 Now	we	are	in	a	position	where	we	can	show	what	will	happen	to	low-skilled	workers	in	
the	future	state	graphically:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3-4	
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To	recall	from	figure	3-2,	the	isoquant	curve	in	the	current	state	is	very	flat	with	a	tangent	point	
that	allows	the	isocost	curve	to	intersect	the	Y-axis	at	a	greater	point	than	the	X-axis,	resulting	
in	most	of	the	hiring	decision	favoring	technology	rather	than	low-skilled	workers.	Figure	3-4	
represents	what	the	tradeoff	will	look	like	in	the	short-run,	when	labor	becomes	more	
expensive	and	technology	becomes	cheaper.	As	you	can	see,	automation	and	labor	have	
become	perfect	substitutes	for	one	another,	resulting	in	a	corner	solution.	This	means	that	the	
optimal	solution,	or	the	point	at	which	firms	will	hire	low-skilled	labor	or	technology,	will	either	
be	entirely	one	or	the	other	but	not	a	combination	of	both.	As	per	our	hypothesis,	firms	will	
hire	all	automation,	and	the	reason	for	this	can	be	seen	by	the	effect	this	has	on	labor	demand:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	labor	demand	graph	shows	us	at	how	many	workers	firms	are	willing	to	hire	at	different	
wages.	In	both	the	current	and	future	states,	labor	supply	will	be	held	constant.	In	the	current	
Figure	3-5	
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state,	wages	and	quantity	of	labor	demand	are	inversely	related,	as	when	wages	rise,	labor	
demanded	falls,	and	the	amount	of	labor	in	the	market	falls	as	a	result.	The	opposite	effect	
happens	when	wages	fall:	labor	demanded	rises	with	the	amount	of	workers	hired.	However,	in	
the	future	state,	where	automation	and	employees	are	perfect	substitutes,	the	decision	to	hire	
employees	is	not	constantly	dependent	on	wages.	The	future	graph	shows	that	firms	only	hire	if	
wage	falls	below	a	certain	point,	where	w/r	<	B.	At	any	other	wage	level,	firms	will	employ	only	
automation	and	no	low-skilled	labor.	As	mentioned,	firms	will	evidently	hire	some	employees	if	
the	wage	level	falls	low	enough,	but	they	would	have	to	fall	to	a	point	that	is	unrealistic.	To	get	
firms	to	hire	any	labor,	the	wage	level	would	have	to	fall	much	lower	than	the	current	level,	
which	in	reality	may	be	very	unlikely	as	the	government	has	laws	in	place	like	minimum	wage	
that	prevent	this.	Therefore,	we	can	conclude	that	in	the	short-run,	firms	will	replace	low-
skilled	labor	with	automation,	as	the	profit-maximizing	and	cost-minimizing	conditions	suggest	
that	this	is	the	optimal	choice.	
	
3.2	Medium-skilled	workers	
While	the	bulk	of	the	later	chapters	of	this	thesis	will	focus	on	low-skilled	workers,	for	
the	potentially	drastic	economic	problems	that	will	arise	in	the	short-term	for	that	segment	of	
workers,	it	is	still	important	to	show	the	impact	automation	will	have	on	medium	and	high-
skilled	workers	in	order	to	show	that	the	economic	burdens	may	become	wide-spread	in	the	
long-run.	Beginning	with	medium-skilled	workers,	we	will	need	to	set	up	a	current	state	that	is	
different	than	that	of	low-skilled	workers.	If	we	can	recall,	the	level	of	substitution	between	
technology	and	low-skilled	labor	is	close	to,	but	not	perfect,	meaning	that	the	isoquant	curve	is	
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flat	but	not	linear,	with	a	steep	isocost	curve,	resulting	in	most	but	not	all	low-skilled	work	
being	performed	by	capital.	Medium-skilled	labor,	according	to	the	National	Skills	Coalition,	
typically	require	education	beyond	high-school	for	a	human	to	perform	and	is	the	largest	cohort	
of	workers	in	the	US.	Evidently,	medium-skilled	labor	is	much	harder	to	automate	than	low-
skilled	work,	which	will	be	reflected	in	its	curvature.	However,	according	to	Figure	1-1,	we	know	
that	there	is	definitely	significant	automation	potential	within	this	segment,	that	has	and	has	
yet	to	be	captured	by	technological	advancement.	Therefore,	both	our	starting	and	end	points	
will	be	much	different	than	the	low-skilled	cohort,	but	the	effect	will	be	very	similar.	The	
current	state	of	substitution	between	capital	and	employment	for	medium-skilled	workers	can	
be	portrayed	graphically	as	follows:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3-6	
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As	the	graph	depicts,	although	much	less	than	low-skilled	workers,	medium-skilled	employees	
have	experienced	substitution	of	their	jobs	in	favor	of	capital.	The	isoquant	curve	is	moderately	
curved,	resulting	in	a	trade-off	between	employees	and	capital	that	strongly	favors	employees.	
But	as	we	mentioned,	there	is	a	lot	of	automation	potential	in	this	space.	So,	what	will	happen	
as	we	make	technological	advancements?	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Much	like	the	low-skilled	worker	cohort,	the	isoquant	curve	will	flatten	due	to	technological	
advancements	that	make	automation	better	at	replicating	medium-skilled	work.	Given	our	
steep	isocost	curve	that	we	derived	in	the	previous	part	of	this	chapter,	the	impending	result	is	
that	firms	that	need	medium-skilled	workers	will	be	able	to	produce	the	same	amount	of	
output	as	before	(q0)	with	fewer	workers.	Evidently,	it	is	not	surprising	that	automation	will	
Figure	3-7	
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have	a	similar	effect	on	medium-skilled	workers,	potentially	reducing	the	amount	of	this	type	of	
labor	demanded	by	firms.	
	
3.3	High-skilled	workers	
It	is	very	likely	that	some	high-skilled	work	can	never	be	automated.	However,	as	long	as	there	
is	some	automation	potential	within	this	group	of	skilled	workers,	it	is	important	to	highlight	it	
to	show	just	how	powerful	an	impact	artificial	intelligence	can	have.	The	best	depiction	of	the	
current	state	of	the	tradeoff	between	employment	of	capital	and	high-skilled	employees	is	the	
total	opposite	of	low-skilled	workers	where	there	is	in	fact	no	substitution	at	all.	In	fact,	
currently,	the	relationship	between	artificial	intelligence	and	high-skilled	workers	is	one	that	is	
best	described	as	perfect	compliments	of	one	another.	If	we	recall	from	chapter	2,	this	
association	can	be	shown	by	the	following	graph:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3-8	
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In	the	above	case,	the	output	level	associated	with	isoquant	curve	q0	can	only	be	achieved	by	
using	20	units	of	labor	and	5	units	of	capital.	Increasing	capital	or	labor	on	their	own	will	not	
change	output.	To	better	understand	this	relationship,	we	can	think	of	a	real-world	example	of	
AI	and	high-skilled	labor	complimenting	each	other	to	work	optimally.	Artificial	intelligence	has	
a	huge	impact	in	the	world	of	healthcare.	One	of	its	biggest	impacts	is	shortening	the	wait	for	
patients	between	taking	tests	and	receiving	diagnosis	and	treatment.	An	example	of	this	is	"The	
Google	Deep	Mind	Project"	which	is	a	program	with	the	goal	of	using	AI	to	read	medical	
documents	within	seconds	in	order	to	provide	patients	with	a	more	accurate	diagnosis,	within	a	
fraction	of	the	time,	hopefully	leading	to	more	success	treating	patients	with	a	wide	range	of	
health	problems.	This	relationship	between	doctor	and	technology	is	one-to-one	(Zaidi).	One	
doctor	taking	the	tests,	running	the	program,	inputting	the	correct	data,	reviewing	the	
programs	diagnosis,	etc.	and	one	program	crunching	the	data	and	providing	the	diagnosis.	In	
this	case,	adding	another	doctor	would	not	make	the	output	any	greater,	in	fact	it	would	
probably	slow	the	process	down	due	to	the	lack	of	a	need	for	another	doctor.	And	having	a	
second	program	would	evidently	be	redundant	as	well,	since	it	would	provide	the	results	at	the	
same	speed	as	the	first	program,	and	there	would	have	to	be	double	the	human	input	at	the	
beginning	of	the	process,	which	would	again,	slow	the	process	down.	But	this	is	merely	the	
current	state.	What	if,	we	were	to	develop	cognitive	automation	so	smart,	that	it	could	actually	
substitute	high-skilled	labor,	and	be	more	than	just	a	compliment	to	it?		
There	are	many	reasons	to	think	that	this	may	be	in	fact	possible.	One	example	that	can	
serve	as	evidence	that	it	is	possible	for	artificial	intelligence	to	substitute	high-skilled	labor	is	in	
the	field	of	data	analytics.	Being	able	to	read,	understand,	and	analyze	data	to	make	proper	
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decisions	based	off	of	it	was	once	a	very	scarce	and	skilled	type	of	work,	which	is	why	data	
analysts	in	certain	industries	get	compensated	as	such.	While	data-driven	decision	making	is	
still	very	much	a	scarce	and	desired	skill,	it	is	now	possible	to	automate	it,	and	given	the	high	
salaries	that	these	workers	make	to	perform	this	task,	it	is	not	unrealistic	to	expect	firms	to	
choose	to	hire	this	automation	as	a	substitute.	
But	as	we	know,	the	technology	can’t	just	be	cheaper	for	firms	to	chose	to	use	it;	it	also	
must	be	just	as	good,	if	not	better.	In	this	case,	despite	data	analysis	being	a	“high”	skill	
requiring	years	of	education	and	experience,	AI	can	actually	perform	it	better.	In	this	field,	
algorithms	are	said	to	have	a	competitive	advantage	over	humans	when	it	comes	to	pattern	
detection	due	to	its	ability	to	read	massive	data	sets	at	an	exponentially	faster	rate	than	
humans	can;	one	of	the	most	important	ability	to	have	when	properly	analyzing	data.	In	
practice,	we	can	see	this	substitution	taking	place	in	two	industries	that	rely	heavily	on	high-
skilled	work:	financial	services	and	healthcare	(Henry-Nickie).	An	example	in	the	former	is	a	
hedge	fund	called	Man	Group,	whose	CEO	Luke	Ellis	claims	that	his	firm	autonomously	manages	
$5.1	billion	in	assets	using	algorithms	developed	by	artificial	intelligence	(Satariano).	Another	
example,	this	time	in	the	healthcare	industry	is	a	startup	called	Enlitic,	a	firm	who	uses	artificial	
intelligence	to	read	CT	and	MRI	scans	and	radiographs.	They	claim	that	their	machines	can	read	
this	data	faster	and	more	accurately	than	four	radiologists	working	at	once	(Parloff).		
Now	that	we	have	provided	evidence	for	it	being	possible	for	high-skilled	work	to	be	
substituted	by	technology	(and	not	just	a	compliment	to	it),	we	can	now	graphically	portray	
what	this	future	state	may	look	like	for	high-skilled	workers	given	this	knowledge:	
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As	we	know,	the	current	state	isoquant	curve	is	a	right	angle	with	no	curvature,	which	tells	us	
that	automation	and	high-skilled	labor	are	compliments	for	one	another.	However,	as	we	
advance	and	become	better	at	replicating	this	work,	we	will	see	that	I	the	future	state	there	will	
be	some	curvature	to	the	isoquant	curve	for	high-skilled	work.	This	means	that	eventually,	firms	
will	opt	to	purchase	artificial	intelligence	in	place	of	high-skilled	workers,	adding	to	the	mass	
economic	outcome	of	our	progression	in	computer	science.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3-9	
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Chapter	4:	The	Short-Run	Problem	of	Income	Inequality	
	
	 As	we	have	portrayed,	all	types	of	labor	will	be	affected	by	AI.	However,	the	rest	of	this	
thesis	will	primarily	focus	on	the	low-skilled	worker	segment.	The	reason	being	is	that	it	is	clear	
that	this	segment	will	drive	our	inequality	analysis	as	the	possibility	of	automation	being	a	
perfect	substitute	of	this	type	of	work	could	have	the	most	severe	and	immediate	impact	on	
the	economy.	If	the	results	outlined	by	our	framework	are	true	for	low-skilled	workers,	then	
one	of	the	most	important	issues	to	look	at	will	be	income	inequality.	If	we	recall	from	our	first	
chapter,	low-skilled	workers	earn	the	lowest	wages.	If	they	are	at	risk	of	losing	their	jobs	to	
technology	or	having	their	wages	reduced,	either	way,	income	inequality	will	worsen	in	the	U.S.	
as	the	lowest	end	of	the	distribution	would	be	poorer,	and	even	more	profits	would	be	directed	
at	the	richest.	This	chapter	will	outline	this	problem	from	two	perspectives	from	two	different	
schools	of	thought,	to	attempt	to	show	that	our	technological	advancements	may	lead	to	an	
increase	in	income	inequality	in	the	U.S.	
	
4.1	Outlining	the	income	inequality	problem	
Income	inequality	in	any	given	country	can	be	best	visualized	by	a	Lorenz	Curve:	
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The	45o	degree	line	that	dissects	the	X-Y	plane	is	called	the	Line	of	Perfect	Equality	and	its	name	
is	accurate	for	what	it	represents.	If	a	country’s	Lorenz	curve	is	represented	by	this	line,	then	
they	have	perfect	income	equality	within	it.	In	the	case	of	Figure	4-1,	60%	of	the	cumulative	
population	earns	60%	of	the	income.	This	would	be	true	for	any	percent	of	the	population	as	
they	would	earn	an	equal	share	of	the	income	in	the	country.	However,	most	country’s	do	not	
experience	perfect	income	equality,	and	their	Lorenz	curve	looks	more	similar	to	the	blue	one	
above.	In	this	case,	60%	of	the	population	only	earns	20%	of	the	income,	and	the	other	40%	
earns	80%.	The	lower	a	country’s	Lorenz	curve	falls	below	the	45o,	the	more	income	inequality	
exists	within	it.	
Figure	4-1	
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In	a	market-based,	capitalistic	economic	system	like	the	U.S.	has	adopted,	it	would	be	
unrealistic	to	expect	there	to	be	perfect	income	equality.	However,	the	gap	between	the	richest	
and	the	poorest	has	been	spreading	and	spreading	in	this	country,	and	there	is	no	evidence	of	
that	stopping	any	time	soon.	It	has	reached	a	point	where	the	gap	is	so	big	that	it	not	merely	a	
product	of	the	economic	system	in	place;	it	is	a	serious	problem	and	the	numbers	do	not	lie.	If	
we	look	at	US	income	shares	by	percent	of	the	population,	the	results	are	as	follows:	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	 		
	 	
	
Figure	4-2	
a)	
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If	we	recall,	in	a	country	with	perfect	income	equality,	1%	of	the	population	earns	1%	of	the	
income,	10%	earns	10%	and	so	on.	However,	in	the	United	States,	the	top	1%	receives	around	
20%	of	the	total	income	and	the	top	10%	is	earning	about	half	of	the	total	income.	
It	is	evident	that	the	US	is	suffering	from	high	levels	of	income	inequality.	While	it	may	
be	trivial	to	some	why	having	severe	income	inequality	in	a	country	is	bad,	it	is	still	important	to	
talk	about	why	it	is	so	harmful	to	an	economy.	First	and	foremost,	high	levels	of	income	
inequality	prevent	a	large	portion	of	the	country	from	being	exposed	to	certain	opportunities	
and	outcomes.	This	means	that	some	people,	given	their	ethnicity,	location	of	birth,	family	
background	etc.	will	not	be	given	the	same	chance	to	succeed	as	other	people	simply	based	on	
their	circumstance	and	not	anything	else.	While	this	is	obviously	not	very	fair	(or	"American"	for	
that	matter),	the	fact	that	a	larger	and	larger	percentage	of	the	country	is	being	restricted	from	
b)	
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achieving	success,	there	are	also	macroeconomic	effects	that	come	as	a	result.	For	example,	a	
country	with	high-income	inequality	tends	to	also	experience	a	slowing	down	of	their	growth	
drivers.	The	reason	being	that	lower-income	household's	inability	to	accumulate	human	or	
physical	capital	and	stay	healthy	which	leads	to	underinvestment	in	these	locations	in	areas	
such	as	education.	When	low-income	households	are	deprived	of	the	opportunity	to	a	good	
education	they	are	less	likely	to	go	to	college,	which	lowers	labor	productivity.	Therefore,	as	the	
amount	of	low-income	households	rises	with	inequality,	the	more	impact	this	lack	on	
productivity	has	on	the	country	as	a	whole.	As	well,	inequality	can	hinder	growth	by	reducing	
investment	as	it	fuels	political,	financial	and	economic	instability	(Kochhar).	
	
	
4.2	Automation's	role	in	income	inequality	
We	are	now	aware	of	what	income	inequality	is,	that	the	United	States	is	currently	
experiencing	alarming	levels	of	it	and	that	we	hypothesized	that	our	analysis	of	how	
automation	and	AI	will	affect	elasticity	of	substitution	may	cause	it	to	get	worse.	The	next	part	
of	Chapter	4	will	try	to	use	economic	theory	to	explain	why	our	technological	advancements	
and	their	effect	on	firm's	decisions	to	hire	more	automation	than	employees	will	lead	to	
increased	income	inequality.	To	reiterate,	we	will	focus	on	the	low-skilled	worker	segment	
because,	as	outlined	in	chapter	3,	they	will	be	the	most	prone	to	substitution	by	AI.	As	well,	
low-skilled	workers	make	up	the	low-income	households	that	we	need	to	make	better	off	to	fix	
income	inequality.	However,	what	we	have	hypothesized	to	find	is	that	these	low-skilled	and	
low-income	workers	are	going	to	be	made	worse	off	by	this	technology,	which	will	ultimately	
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worsen	income	inequality	in	the	US.	In	order	to	hopefully	provide	stronger	evidence	for	this	
conclusion,	this	chapter	will	introduce	two	different	approaches	to	the	relationship	between	
advancements	in	automation	and	increased	income	inequality.	
	
4.3	A	neoclassical	approach	
We	will	remain	consistent	in	our	theoretical	framework	to	begin	with,	by	looking	at	this	
income	inequality	issue	with	a	neoclassical	framework.	To	recall,	the	future	state	of	elasticity	of	
substitution	between	automation	and	low-skilled	workers	leaves	us	at	a	corner	solution;	
meaning	we	will	either	hire	all	automation	or	only	high-skilled	workers,	depending	on	which	is	
cheaper.	We	hypothesized	that	eventually,	it	is	probable	that	this	technology	will	become	
cheaper	than	paying	employees	at	the	real	wage.	Therefore,	firms	may	exclusively	hire	
automation	to	perform	low-skilled	work	in	the	short-run.	The	impending	result	of	this	effect	on	
elasticity	on	the	neoclassical	labor	demand	graph	will	be	as	follows:	
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In	chapter	3	we	used	this	graph	to	explain	the	condition	for	which	firms	will	hire	all	capital	and	
no	low-skilled	labor.	If	we	recall,	firms	chose	to	do	this	insofar	as	w/r	>	B.	This	same	graph	can	
be	used	to	portray	the	neoclassical	outlook	on	how	automation	may	worsen	income	inequality.	
Given	the	graph	above,	there	are	two	possible	scenarios:	1)	The	future	state	wage	rate	remains	
at	its	current	level	(or	rises),	and	firms	have	0	labor	demand	for	low-skilled	workers	as	they	
would	much	prefer	to	install	automation	for	cheaper.	Or	2)	the	wage	rate	drops	significantly	in	
the	future,	making	it	profit	maximizing	to	hire	some,	but	less,	low-skilled	workers.	Although	it	is	
probable	that	scenario	2)	will	never	happen	considering	real	wages	consistently	rise	and	it	is	
unlikely	that	the	government	would	slash	the	minimum	wage,	which	is	the	rate	that	most	of	
low-skilled	workers	earn.	Regardless,	in	either	scenario,	if	they	come	true,	low-skilled	workers	
Figure	4-3	
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are	made	much	worse	off,	worsening	income	inequality.	In	the	first	outcome,	low-skilled	
workers	are	completely	unemployed,	turning	their	already	low	incomes	into	nothing.	In	the	
second,	they	are	employed,	but	their	low	incomes	become	even	lower.	As	one	can	see,	in	either	
scenario,	according	to	the	neoclassical	framework,	the	already	significant	problem	of	income	
inequality	in	the	U.S.	will	worsen	if	our	hypotheses	come	true.	
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Chapter	5:	An	Alternative	Approach	–	The	Sraffa	Model	
	
As	previously	mentioned,	we	will	now	bring	in	a	non-neoclassical	approach	to	income	
inequality	in	order	to	strengthen	and	hopefully	confirm	our	hypothesis.	The	model	we	will	use	
was	created	by	Piero	Sraffa,	an	Italian	economist	who	provided	a	unique	outlook	on	income	
inequality	in	1960,	which	happens	to	be	extremely	useful	when	analyzing	the	problem	at	hand	
(HET).	This	framework	differs	from	our	neoclassical	one	in	a	few	ways.	Firstly,	in	the	
neoclassical	model	profit	is	determined	by	the	market;	specifically,	consumer	demand.	In	
Sraffa’s	model,	profits	are	determined	by	the	worker-capitalist	conflict.	It	focusses	on	this	
conflict	by	introducing	a	variable	labeled	“r”	which	represents	how	much	profits	a	capitalist	or	
owner	keeps	for	himself.	By	focusing	on	the	worker-capitalist	conflict,	we	obtain	different	
insight	into	the	issue	at	hand;	as	we	will	see	moving	forward.	He	begins	by	conveniently	
assuming	a	two-sector	economy	consisting	of	2	industries	that	produces	two	goods.	Good	one	
or	"i"	is	a	natural	resource,	wheat,	and	good	two	or	"j"	is	iron	which	represents	capital.	To	
produce	either	good,	we	will	need	some	combination	of	both	goods	and	some	labor.	We	will	
call	variations	of	these	combinations	as	"recipes".	The	following	is	an	example	of	what	a	recipe	
in	this	model	may	look	like:			
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	5-1	
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The	left	column	represents	the	recipe	for	producing	one	unit	of	good	1.	Similarly,	the	right	
column	represents	the	recipe	for	producing	a	unit	of	good	2.	For	example,	the	left-hand	recipe	
tells	us	that	in	order	to	produce	one	unit	of	good	1,	we	would	need	0.3	units	of	good	1,	0.2	
units	of	good	2,	and	0.1	units	of	labor.	We	will	continue	to	assume	that	firms’	actions	will	be	
guided	by	profit-maximization	(Borjas:	2013).	Meaning,	if	given	the	choice	to	hire	more	labor	or	
capital	to	produce	the	same	number	of	units	of	either	good,	they	will	choose	to	hire	the	
combination	or	recipe	granting	them	the	most	profit.	We	will	use	the	following	equation	to	
measure	profit,	which	we	will	then	use	to	determine	firms’	hiring	decisions	and	ultimately	its	
effect	on	income	inequality:	
	
Profits	=	TR-TC	
	
In	the	above	equation,	TR	stands	for	total	revenue	and	can	be	calculated	by	multiplying	the	
total	quantity	of	the	goods	produced	by	the	price	of	the	good.	TC	(Total	costs),	are	the	costs	of	
production	and	can	be	calculated	by	multiplying	the	costs	of	both	inputs	by	the	number	of	
inputs	required	to	produce	the	good,	multiplying	the	wage	rate	by	the	required	units	of	labor,	
and	finding	the	sum	of	the	two.	We	can	refer	to	the	cost	of	an	input	as	either	"P(1)"	or	"P(2)"	
and	the	wage	rate	as	"w".	Finally,	an	important	metric	we	must	add	that	will	help	with	
determining	the	effect	of	technological	advancements	on	income	inequality	is	the	share	of	
income	the	capitalist	receives	from	profits,	rather	than	workers.	The	percent	share	capitalists	
take	can	be	labeled	as	r(i)	and	is	the	same	in	both	industries.	
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		 A	conclusion	Sraffa	comes	to	is	that	as	the	percent	of	profits	that	capitalists	take	
increases,	wages	decrease.	Proving	this	notion	will	be	important	for	our	analysis	of	how	
technological	changes	affect	income	inequality.	An	assumption	Sraffa	makes,	which	is	essential	
for	our	following	steps,	is	non-labor	cost	is	paid	in	advance	of	production	but	labor	is	paid	after.	
This	means	the	only	costs	per-unit	the	capitalist	faces	is	the	non-labor	costs	or	
[p(i)*a(ii)+p(j)*a(ji)].	Therefore,	profit	per	unit	can	be	calculated	as	1=r[p(i)*a(ii)+p(j)*a(ji)].	For	
our	upcoming	analysis,	we	will	now	need	to	rewrite	the	accounting	identity	Revenue	=	Costs	+	
Profits	on	a	per	unit	bases	(which	will	become	more	apparent	why	as	we	move	forward)	for	
both	industries;	which	we	are	now	equipped	to	do:	
	
Industry	1:	[p(1)a(11)	+	p(2)a(21)]	+	wL(1)	+	r[p(1)a(11)	+	p(2)a(21)]	=	p(1)	
	
	
For	ease	of	use,	we	can	rewrite	as	for	both	industry	1	and	industry	2	respectively:	
	
(1) 			(1+r)	[p(1)a(11)	+	p(2)a(21)]	+	wL(1)	=	p(1)	
(2) 			(1+r)	[p(1)a(12)	+	p(2)a(22)]	+	wL(2)	=	p(2)	
	
Since	there	are	4	unknown	variables	in	the	above	equations,	we	will	need	to	make	the	
appropriate	assumptions	to	narrow	it	down	to	2.	We	will	assume	the	price	of	good	2,	p(2),	is	
equal	to	1.	This	eliminates	a	variable	and	does	not	hurt	our	analysis	because	we	are	still	able	to	
compare	the	price	of	good	1,	relative	to	good	2;	the	exact	amounts	aren’t	necessarily	essential.	
Profit	Per	Unit	 Revenue	Per	Unit/Price	Cost	Per	Unit	
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Also,	we	will	set	r=0%	in	our	first	calculation	and	20%	in	our	second.	This	removes	the	final	
extra	variable	and	allows	us	to	prove	Sraffa’s	hypothesis	that	wages	decrease	as	the	profit	rate	
increases.	If	we	plug	in	the	values	from	the	example	recipe	we	used	(Figure	5-1)	previously,	and	
the	assumptions	we	just	made,	starting	with	r=0%	(capitalists	keep	0%	of	profits)	we	get:	
	
(1) (1+0)[0.3p(1)	+	0.2(1)]	+	0.1w	=	p(1);		
(2) (1+0)[0.2p(1)	+	0.4(1)]	+	0.2w	=	1;		
0.1w	=	0.7p(1)	–	0.2;		
0.2w	=	0.6	–	0.2p(1);		
7p(1)	–	2	=	w	=	3	–	p(1);	8p(1)	=	5;		
w	=	3	–	p(1)	=	3	–	0.625;	
												0.3p(1)	+	0.2	+	0.1w	=	p(1)	
												0.2p(1)	+	0.4	+	0.2w	=	1	
												w	=	7p(1)	–	2	
												w	=	3	–	p(1)	
												p(1)	=	5/8;	p(1)	=	0.625	
												w	=	2.375.	
	
If	we	do	the	same	analysis	with	r=20%,	the	corresponding	values	are	p(1)=0.658	and	w=1.811.	It	
is	clear	that	an	increase	in	the	rate	of	profit	is	kept	by	capitalists,	wages	decrease	and	prices	
increase.	This	result	is	not	only	important	for	the	analysis	we	are	about	to	do	to	show	the	
relationship	between	technological	advancements	and	increased	income	inequality,	but	it	will	
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also	give	us	key	insight	to	make	recommendations	on	how	to	stop	it	from	worsening,	which	we	
will	talk	more	about	in	Chapter	6.	
We	have	now	completed	enough	analysis	to	begin	answering	our	question:	will	
technological	advancements	cause	firms	to	employ	less	low-skilled	labor,	and	replace	them	
with	technology	and/or	pay	them	at	a	lower	rate,	worsening	income	inequality.	In	order	to	do	
this,	we	will	have	to	use	two	different	recipes	for	production,	one	with	our	current	state	of	
technology,	and	another	representing	what	would	happen	if	we	continue	to	improve	at	
replicating	labor	with	capital.	We	will	assume	all	work	in	the	industries	is	low	skilled,	so	we	can	
specifically	see	the	effect	on	the	group	of	workers	on	the	lowest	end	of	the	income	distribution.	
Firms	will	have	the	following	recipes	available	to	them	in	order	to	produce	both	goods:		
	
Recipe	1	
a(11)=0.3					a(12)=0.2	
a(21)=0.2					a(22)=0.4	
L(1)=0.1					L(2)=0.2	
	
Recipe	2	
	
a’(11)=0.3					a’(12)=0.2	
a’(21)=0.3					a’(22)=0.4	
L’(1)=0.05					L’(2)-0.2	
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In	the	above	recipes,	recipe	1	represents	our	current	state	of	technology,	and	recipe	2	
represents	an	alternative	option	if	the	firm	should	choose	to	adopt	new	technology.	In	our	case,	
we	will	assume	this	new	technology	is	automation.	The	intuition	behind	the	differences	
between	recipe	1	and	recipe	2	is	as	follows:	since	automation	has	improved,	firms	are	able	to	
produce	one	unit	of	good	1	with	half	the	amount	of	labor	as	before.	However,	the	firm	won't	
choose	the	new	recipe	over	the	old	one,	unless	the	extra	amount	of	money	invested	in	the	new	
technology	is	less	than	the	amount	saved	from	hiring	less	labor.	To	calculate	the	extra	money	
spent	on	capital	we	multiply	the	difference	between	the	amounts	of	good	2	necessary	to	
produce	good	1	(a[21]-a'[21])	by	the	price	of	good	2.	To	find	the	savings	on	labor,	we	will	
multiply	the	difference	between	the	amount	of	labor	necessary	to	produce	a	unit	of	good	1	by	
the	wage.	Using	those	formulas,	we	get;	first	assuming	r=0%	and	using	w=0.2375	from	our	
previous	calculations:	
	
Extra	spent	on	capital	=	(0.3-0.2)*1=0.1	
Amount	saved	on	labor	=	(0.1-0.05)*2.375=0.119		
	
Since	the	amount	saved	on	labor	costs	exceeds	the	cost	of	adopting	this	new	technology,	firms	
will	choose	to	replace	workers	with	the	new	tech.	However,	let’s	see	what	happens	when	we	
increase	the	rate	of	profit	to	r=20%	and	as	a	result	w=1.811:	
	
Extra	spent	on	capital	=	(0.3-0.2)*1=0.1	
Amount	saved	on	labor	=	(0.1-0.05)*1.811=0.091	
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Since	the	amount	saved	on	labor	costs	is	less	than	the	actual	investment	to	purchase	
automation	to	replace	workers,	the	firm	will	choose	not	to	adopt	the	new	technology	and	
remain	with	recipe	1.	Although	firms	will	decide	not	to	install	the	automation	in	this	case,	it	is	
essential	to	note	that	wages	had	to	decrease	in	order	for	them	to	make	that	decision	(Hahnel).	
	 It	is	clear	that	much	like	our	neoclassical	analysis,	the	Sraffian	model	would	confirm	our	
hypothesis	about	artificial	intelligence	and	increased	income	inequality.	In	the	two	examples	we	
looked	at,	one	where	firms	adopt	capital	that	replaces	workers	and	the	other	in	which	they	
choose	not	to,	both	resulted	in	an	outcome	that	worsened	income	inequality.	In	the	first,	we	
explained	what	would	happen	if	this	new	technology	becomes	more	cost-efficient	than	hiring	
workers.	Since	we	have	acknowledged	that	we	are	more	than	capable	of	replicating	almost	all	
low-skilled	labor	with	automation	and	assume	firms	will	be	guided	by	profit-maximization,	this	
scenario	shows	what	would	happen	if	the	only	barrier	(cost)	this	technology	is	currently	facing	
when	it	comes	to	displacing	a	significant	amount	of	low-skilled	jobs	is	removed.	Once	the	price	
of	purchasing	automation	to	produce	goods	or	services	is	realized	to	be	less	over	time	than	
hiring	workers,	firms	will	eventually	begin	the	process	of	switching	to	a	more	capital-intensive	
production	process.	In	the	second	example,	while	low-skilled	workers	keep	their	jobs,	they	are	
paid	at	a	lower	rate	than	their	already	low	income.	As	previously	mentioned,	this	will	inherently	
worsen	income	inequality	because	low-skilled	workers,	who	make	the	least	amount	of	income,	
will	make	even	less	income	(if	any)	due	to	the	even	greater	surplus	of	potential	laborers	for	the	
shrinking	amount	of	vacancies	available.	We	can	conclude	that	Sraffa’s	model	would	also	
confirm	our	prediction	that	advancements	in	AI	may	lead	to	worse	income	inequality	in	the	US.	
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Chapter	6:	Policy	Recommendations	and	Conclusions	
	 	
While	this	paper	to	this	point	has	outlined	the	potential	negative	economic	outcomes	of	
a	prominent	issue,	it	would	not	be	complete,	nor	right,	to	fail	to	provide	recommendations	
based	on	the	analysis	we	have	done	to	try	and	stop	them	from	happening.	To	this	point,	we	
have	determined	that	it	is	most	likely	that	automation	and	artificial	intelligence	will	impact	low-
skilled	workers	the	most,	and	most	immediately.	We	have	done	this	by	using	a	neoclassical	
approach	to	the	labor	market	and	elasticity	of	substitution	between	capital	and	employment.	
What	we	found	is	that	based	on	data	outlining	the	present	substitution	levels,	and	predictions	
about	the	future,	that	the	tradeoff	between	automation	and	low-skilled	workers	in	the	future	
can	be	best	described	as	perfect	substitutes.	The	framework	that	we	chose	tells	us	that	in	this	
scenario,	where	technology	and	low-skilled	workers	are	perfect	substitutes	for	one	another,	we	
arrive	at	a	corner	solution.	This	means	that	firms	will	hire	only	technology	or	only	low-skilled	
workers;	whichever	is	more	cost-efficient.	We	then	provided	reasons	for	why	it	is	possible	for	
automation	to	be	more	cost-efficient	than	paying	the	wages	of	low-skilled	workers,	coming	to	a	
hypothesis	that	firms	will	replace	their	remaining	low-skilled	workers	with	automation.		
We	then	explained	that	although	this	may	be	an	unemployment	problem,	we	would	be	
better	off	treating	this	as	an	income	inequality	issue.	This	is	the	case	for	2	reasons:	1)	It	is	
unclear	whether	or	not	our	advancements	in	automation	will	lead	to	an	increased	level	of	
unemployment	as	these	progressions	may	add	a	job	for	every	job	it	takes	away	and	2)	even	if	it	
does,	income	inequality	will	increase,	as	low-skilled	and	low-pay	workers	will	be	at	harm.	Next,	
we	summarized	how	these	people	will	be	at	harm	by	deriving	the	outcomes	based	on	two	
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different	approached	to	income	inequality:	a	neoclassical	and	a	Sraffian	model.	Both	
frameworks,	although	with	differing	methodology,	came	to	similar	conclusions.	If	our	
predictions	about	the	relationship	between	AI	and	low-skilled	workers	are	true,	they	will	have	
one	of	two	things	happen	to	them.	They	could	either	be	replaced	by	technology	as	firms	opt	to	
hire	AI	in	their	place,	or	firms	will	decide	not	to	but	a	wage	cut	is	necessary	for	them	to	chose	
this	route.	Either	way,	low-skilled	workers	are	made	worse	off,	increasing	income	inequality.	
	
6.1	Policy	Recommendations	
Our	next	and	final	objective	of	this	thesis	is	to	provide	policy	recommendations	on	how	
to	offset	these	outcomes	or	stop	them	all	together.	There	are	a	few	ways	the	government	can	
prevent	technology	from	increasing	unemployment,	but	we	will	mainly	focus	on	two:	taxation	
and	redistribution.	As	we	will	see,	taxation	will	be	a	short-term	fix.	However,	if	we	really	want	
to	stop	automation	from	increasing	income	inequality,	proper	redistribution	of	the	tax	revenue	
will	be	essential.	Beginning	with	taxation,	in	order	to	reduce	increased	income	inequality	from	
substitution	of	low-skilled	labor	with	technology,	the	government	will	need	to	implement	new	
tax	laws	that	disincentivize	firms	from	making	this	substitution.	As	we	know,	according	to	our	
framework,	firms	will	always	act	in	profit-maximizing	ways,	regardless	of	the	outcome.	
Therefore,	our	preventative	policy	recommendations	will	have	to	target	variables	that	make	the	
profit-maximizing	decision	not	to	replace	low-skilled	workers	or	lower	their	wages	in	favor	of	
technology.	There	are	two	ways	this	can	be	done.	Our	recommended	policies	can	either	make	
capital	more	expensive	or	make	low-skilled	labor	less	expensive.	We	will	focus	on	using	taxation	
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to	accomplish	the	former	because	reducing	wages	simply	cannot	be	the	answer,	as	making	
labor	less	expensive	would	make	income	inequality	worse.	
But	how	can	we	use	taxation	to	make	production	via	automation	more	expensive,	
disincentivizing	firms	to	substitute	it	in	place	of	low-skilled	workers?	If	a	targeted	new	tax	is	
imposed	on	firms,	we	may	be	able	to	prevent	firms	from	doing	so.	For	example,	firms	could	be	
taxed	for	having	too	high	of	an	output	to	employee	ratio.	If	a	firm	produces	a	high	enough	level	
of	output,	while	hiring	few	low-skilled	workers,	all	revenue	generated	after	this	point	should	be	
taxed	at	a	higher	rate.	This	would	disincentivize	firms	from	automating	their	low-skilled	work	to	
a	point	that	their	ratio	of	revenue	to	workers	is	too	high.	This	also	makes	choosing	to	install	
automation	less	cost-efficient,	making	it	more	profitable	to	keep	low-skilled	workers	employed,	
which	would	prevent	worsening	income	inequality.	Theoretically,	this	change	would	flatten	the	
isocost	curve	associated	with	our	framework,	reducing	the	substitution	of	employment	for	
capital.	
This	potential	fix	is	merely	a	short-term	solution,	as	we	will	continue	to	technologically	
advance	and	this	problem	of	income	inequality	will	keep	reoccurring.	However,	what	it	will	do	
is	give	us	the	time,	and	potentially	the	capital	(via	the	tax	revenue	that	it	generates)	to	provide	
a	long-term	and	hopefully	permanent	fix.	There	may	be	some	opportunities	to	redistribute	the	
revenue	generated	from	the	new	tax,	in	order	to	fund	longer-term	solutions	to	growing	income	
inequality.	Firstly,	just	as	it	is	essential	to	be	familiar	with	things	like	a	computer,	a	telephone,	
etc.	in	today's	day	and	age.	Tomorrow's	baseline	of	understanding	of	technology	won't	be	as	
basic.	It	may	be	necessary	to	have	a	general	understanding	of	computer	science	to	contribute	
to	tomorrow's	society.	Some	of	this	money	should	be	redistributed	to	provide	courses	
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embedded	in	middle	and	high	school	systems	nationwide,	which	would	prepare	the	next	
generation	sufficiently	for	this	next	wave	of	technological	advancement.	Another	priority	that	if	
focused	on	would	help	defend	against	income	inequality	caused	by	technological	advancement	
is	a	job	guarantee	program.	Economists	who	advocate	for	job	guarantee,	suggest	that	a	
program	that	grants	every	American	a	job	with	a	solid	wage	and	benefits	can	potentially	be	the	
best	and	fastest	fix	to	income	inequality	for	a	few	reasons.	First	of	all,	if	every	American	has	a	
job,	inequality	is	immediately	made	better,	as	all	of	those	unemployed	are	now	making	a	stable	
wage.	Therefore,	those	at	the	very	bottom	of	the	income	distribution,	are	now	made	better	off,	
reducing	income	inequality	overall.	However,	the	benefits	do	not	stop	there.	Theorists	in	favor	
of	job	guarantee	also	claim	that	wages	will	increase,	making	wage	earners	better	off,	which	will	
also	reduce	income	inequality.	When	this	program	is	paired	with	a	taxation	on	too	high	of	an	
output	to	employee	ratio,	there	may	be	some	potential	for	a	long-term	solution	to	income	
inequality	caused	by	technological	advancements.		
	
6.2	Missing	pieces	and	potential	next	steps	
	 This	very	complex	solution,	although	extremely	simplified,	comes	with	many	
considerations	that	need	to	be	taken	into	account	for	it	to	work.	For	example,	proper	policies	
would	have	to	accompany	this	new	tax	to	make	sure	that	firms	simply	don’t	move	their	
production	to	a	different	country	that	allows	for	mass	automation,	making	income	inequality	
even	worse	as	all	jobs,	low,	medium,	and	high,	will	all	be	gone.	As	well,	there	is	potential	to	
examine	what	would	happen	to	aggregate	demand	if	mass	automation	occurs.	It	would	be	
interesting	to	study	the	effects	of	our	hypothesis	that	all	low-skilled	labor	may	be	replaced	by	
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automation	on	overall	economic	health.	The	premise	being	that	if	all	low-skilled	laborers	are	
unemployed,	will	firms	have	a	big	enough	market	to	sell	too?	What	if	capitalists	hold	too	much	
of	the	production	power	and	profits	that	they	simply	cannot	sell	their	goods	or	services	to	
anyone,	because	their	market	was	stripped	of	all	their	disposable	income	due	to	automation?	
One	final	area	of	this	issue	that	would	be	interesting	to	study	is	the	role	of	managers	(who	are	
considered	medium-skilled)	in	this	new	work	environment.	Management	plays	a	very	vital	role	
in	a	firm’s	success,	as	they	use	their	strong	interpersonal	skills	to	synergize	employees	with	
upper	management	and	owners	and	makes	sure	things	run	smoothly.	However,	what	happens	
if	employees	are	replaced	by	technology?	Would	managers	become	irrelevant?	What	other	
skills	would	they	have	to	possess	other	than	interpersonal	skills	to	perform	their	job?		
	
6.3	Conclusion	
	 While	this	thesis	serves	as	a	theoretical	contribution	to	the	concept	of	“robots	taking	
our	jobs”,	there	is	undoubtedly	a	lot	of	tangible	lessons	that	have	been	uncovered.	First	and	
foremost,	this	is	a	real	issue.	The	conflict	between	technology	and	employment	is	real	and	
economically	significant	to	study	as	done	in	this	thesis.	Additionally,	if	anything	at	all,	we	have	
provided	a	framework	that	makes	the	issue	much	easier	to	understand.	One	of	our	first	goals	
was	to	make	sense	of	the	concept	of	robots	taking	jobs	and	I	believe	we	have	successfully	done	
so.	By	segmenting	workers	into	3	segments	(low,	medium,	and	high-skilled)	and	worked	
through	a	neoclassical	framework,	we	were	able	to	come	to	logical	conclusions	on	what	the	
outcomes	of	our	technological	progress	may	be.	Considering	that	we	began	by	(although	half-
jokingly)	stating	that	we	were	all	doomed,	it	is	safe	to	say	that	after	reading	this	thesis	one	can	
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at	least	make	a	rational	decision	for	themselves	whether	or	not	he	thinks	my	hypotheses	are	
correct	or	make	his	own	predictions	by	critiquing	the	claims	I	have	made.	Nonetheless,	it	will	be	
interesting	to	see	how	the	issue	of	technological	unemployment	will	unfold,	and	hopefully	be	
monitored	as	we	enter	this	new	wave	of	progression,	so	that	we	can	be	ready	for	the	potential	
threats	that	come	with	it.	
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